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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY ON THE MOVE:
CIGARETTE MANUFACTURERS MAY SOON FEEL THE
HEAT
To date, plaintiffs have failed to recover a single penny in dam-
ages from cigarette manufacturers for smoking-related injuries.
However, a new wave of lawsuits has revitalized the controversy
over cigarette manufacturer liability. Scientific evidence linking
cigarette smoking to death and disease is mounting. Moreover, the
tort law doctrines of strict liability and comparative fault have
evolved dramatically so as to favor the injured plaintiff. This
Comment argues that these doctrines should be expanded to im-
pose long overdue liability on the cigarette manufacturers for in-
juries caused by tobacco products.
INTRODUCTION
In 1984 the tobacco industry grossed over 30.7 billion dollars;1
during this same period more than 300,000 deaths were associated
with these tobacco products.2 For over three decades, injured smok-
ers have sought recovery from cigarette manufacturers for their inju-
ries, but the industry has yet to pay a penny in damages.' Besides
offering a slim chance of recovery, lawsuits against tobacco compa-
nies traditionally have proved to be a tremendous burden for plain-
I. San Diego Union, Dec. 23, 1985, at A9, col. 1.
2. H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3718, 3726.
3. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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tiffs, often continuing for years.4 Nonetheless, within the past year
plaintiffs have filed numerous lawsuits against various cigarette
manufacturers.
The uphill battle these plaintiffs face is alleviated somewhat
through the help of many organizations that oppose the tobacco in-
dustry.' These organizations, such as Group Against Smoke Pollu-
tants (GASP) and Action on Smoking and Health (ASH), are com-
bining their resources in an effort to hold the tobacco industry
responsible for the adverse effects of its products. They have joined
with numerous physicians to seek cancer patients as potential plain-
tiffs in lawsuits aimed at cigarette manufacturers.7 As a result, the
tobacco industry has begun to feel the pressure of increased
litigation.
Much to the dismay of the tobacco industry, as litigation has in-
creased so too has the chance of plaintiff recovery. For the most
part, two factors raise the potential of increased plaintiff recovery.
First, scientific evidence which correlates cigarette smoking with
cancer is mounting.8 Although the tobacco industry steadfastly ref-
uses to acknowledge a causal relationship between cigarettes and
cancer, 9 both Congress10 and the American public increasingly be-
lieve that cigarettes cause cancer."1 Second, the doctrines of strict
liability and comparative fault have evolved dramatically so as to
favor the injured plaintiff. This evolution evidences a trend toward
increasing manufacturer responsibility for product-related injuries.
This Comment first examines the development of the scientific evi-
dence linking cigarette smoking to a number of diseases, as well as
4. Three of the 10 reported cigarette lawsuits have lasted over 12 years. The
plaintiff in Aibright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1972),
afj'd, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974), litigated his claim
from 1962 to 1974. In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.
1961), affid on reh'g, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966),
modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,-386 U.S. 1009 (1967), the plaintiff
filed his case in 1954 and litigation finally ended in 1967. Likewise, Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), question certified on reh'g, 154 So. 2d 169
(Fla. 1963), rev'd and remanded, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd and remanded on
reh'g, 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970), commenced in 1957 only to end in the plaintiff's final
defeat 13 years later in 1970.
5. See Brody, Recovery Against Tobacco Companies, 21 TRIAL 48, 49 (1985).
6. Rust, Legal Attack on Tobacco Flares, Am. Med. News, Sept. 20, 1985, at 1,
col. 2.
7. Id.
8. See generally H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3718.
9. See Rust, supra note 6.
10. 123 CONG. REc. H594 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1977)("We can no longer quietly
turn our backs on the mountain of scientific evidence proving that cigarette smoking is
dangerous to health.").
11. Because causation is a jury issue, a correlation may exist between public opin-
ion and jury determination of causation.
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the judicial reactions to lawsuits brought by injured smokers. The
Comment focuses on the judicial trend towards facilitating plaintiff
recovery through the application of strict products liability and com-
parative fault. Recognizing the traditional roadblocks to recovery,
the Comment argues that a liberal application of the strict products
liability doctrine, when coupled with the doctrine of comparative
negligence, provides injured smokers the best path to recovery. Be-
cause the foremost policy goal of the strict products liability doctrine
is that of loss distribution,12 no reason exists to refrain from impos-
ing strict liability on producers of obviously harmful products such
as cigarettes. Cigarette smoking imposes an immense cost upon the
public in terms of health care and lost productivity 13 - costs which
could be internalized by the tobacco industry and its consumers if
liability is imposed upon cigarette manufacturers. This Comment
concludes that the cigarette industry must now take responsibility
for the hundreds of thousands of injuries caused by its products.
CANCER AND RELATED SMOKING DISEASES
Cigarette manufacturers consistently maintain that scientific stud-
ies fail to show a causal relationship between smoking and disease.1 4
However, evidence is mounting against this contention. A growing
number of studies conclude that cigarette smoking is a major cause
of lung, larynx, oral cavity, and esophagus cancer, contributes to
bladder, kidney, and pancreas cancer, 15 and may be linked to genetic
damage.16 Despite the results of these studies, cigarette manufactur-
ers still refuse to acknowledge that their products injure the users. 7
The Surgeon General's Report of 1964,18 concerning the adverse
12. See generally Levy & Ursin, Tort Law in California: At the Crossroads, 67
CALIF. L. REV. 497, 498 (1979).
13. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
14. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 911 (1970); Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartigue
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
15. See H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3718, 3726-27.
16. Researchers from Baylor College of Medicine, working in conjunction with
the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, Columbia University's College
of Physicians and Surgeons, and the University of North Carolina Medical School, claim
to have developed a test that demonstrates a link between smoking and genetic damage.
See San Diego Union, Dec. 27, 1985, at A13, col. 1.
17. See Rust, supra note 6.
18. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT
OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SER-
VICE (1964) [hereinafter cited as the 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT].
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effects of smoking on health, was monumental in its significance.
Before 1964 the medical community itself was not absolutely con-
vinced that cigarette smoking was harmful, 19 even though some stud-
ies suggested a causal link between smoking and lung cancer as early
as the 1920s.2° After examining over 6000 medical and scientific re-
ports, which included animal experiments, clinical studies, autopsies,
and population studies,21 the Surgeon General's advisory committee
concluded that cigarette smoking was indeed causally related to lung
cancer. 22 The committee further found that cigarette smoking in-
creased the risk of chronic bronchitis and emphysema 23 and was a
significant factor in causing larynx cancer.24 After the publication of
these findings, there has been little doubt within the medical commu-
nity that "cigarettes cause more preventable death, disease, and dis-
ability than any other known agent."2 5
Spurred by the 1964 Surgeon General's Report,28 Congress took
action on smoking and its related health problems. On July 27, 1965,
Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act, 7 which became effective on January 1, 1966. The Act sought to
inform the public of the health hazards associated with cigarette
smoking by requiring a warning on each cigarette package.28 Al-
though Congress did not intend to ban the sale and consumption of
cigarettes, believing that the smoker "has the right to smoke or not
19. For example, it was not unusual for cigarette advertisements to portray that
certain cigarettes were "Best for You," or that the "Nose, throat, [and] accessory organs
[were] not adversely affected by [cigarette] smoking." See Garner, Cigarette Depen-
dency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1442 (1980).
And one doctor reported that, when speaking to physicians at the American Society of
Thoracic Surgeons and the American College of Chest Physicians before 1960, he could
not even see across the room because of the cigarette smoke. See Rust, supra note 6, at
30, col. 1.
20. Garner, Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269, 281 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Cigarettes and Welfare Reform].
21. A variety of studies were undertaken during the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and
1950s, culminating with the Surgeon General's Report in 1964. These studies are out-
lined in Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, supra note 20, at 280-83, and in Comment, The
Deadly Weed: Cigarettes are in Trouble, 5 Hous. L. REV. 717, 719-21 (1968).
22. 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 18, at 31.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 32.
25. See Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, supra note 20, at 280.
26. The report concluded that "[c]igarette smoking is a health hazard of signifi-
cant importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action." 1964
SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 18, at 33.
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
Stat. 282, and amended in 1984 by Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2204 (1984)). The 1965
Act required that cigarette packages be labeled with the following warning: "Caution:
Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to your Health." The Act barred until July 1,
1969, any federal, state, or local authority from requiring any other warning. For a legis-
lative history of the Act, see 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2350.
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
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to smoke,"29 Congress observed that the smoker "has the right to
know that smoking may be hazardous to his health."30
In 1969 Congress revised the 1965 warning label31 to read,
"Warning: The Surgeon General has determined that cigarette
smoking is dangerous to your health,"3' and prohibited cigarette ad-
vertising on radio and television.3 3 The revision of the warning from"smoking may be hazardous" to "smoking is dangerous" was
prompted by legislative concern that the 1965 warning was inade-
quate in light of further findings of the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare (HEW) concerning the health risks of cigarette
smoking.34 The HEW studies confirmed the findings of the 1964
Surgeon General's Report - that cigarette smoking is the main
cause of lung cancer and greatly increases the risk of death from
chronic bronchitis and emphysema.3 5 Additionally, the HEW reports
found that "cigarette smoking can contribute to the development of
cardiovascular disease."3 In light of these findings, Congress felt
that a stronger warning was necessary to preserve the public health
and better inform the public of the dangers of smoking.37
These measures, however, were insufficient. In the decade follow-
ing the passage of the 1969 Act, scientific research yielded new in-
formation concerning the effects of cigarette smoking on health. By
1983 the Surgeon General had labeled cigarette smoking as "the
chief, single avoidable cause of death in our society and the most
important public issue of our time."38 In 1983 the Surgeon General
reported that cigarette smoking significantly increases the risk of
miscarriage, premature births, and low birth weight in pregnant
women,39 and that cigarette smoke contains carbon monoxide.40
The mounting dangers resulting from cigarette smoking prompted
Congress to take further action. In 1984 Congress again revised the
29. 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2350, 2352.
30. Id.
31. See supra note 27.
32. S. REP. No. 566, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2652.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2654. Reports were made to Congress in 1967, 1968, and 1969.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2652.
38. H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3718, 3725.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 3729.
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required warning label.4' The Comprehensive Smoking Education
Act4 2 requires that the previous health warning43 be replaced by one
of four statements that would be displayed quarterly on the packages
and advertising of each cigarette brand sold or distributed in the
United States." These labels are far more explicit in their warning
than the 1969 warnings and reflect Congressional concern over the
mounting health hazards of smoking.
Despite the Surgeon General's many reports to Congress, the ciga-
rette manufacturers have failed to acknowledge that a causal rela-
tionship between cigarette smoking and disease exists.45 Rather, the
tobacco industry maintains that only a statistical relationship exists
between cigarette smoking and disease, and that a mere statistical
relationship does not establish causation. 46 The tobacco industry is
not without support. For example, in deliberating over the 1965 Fed-
eral Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Congress received tes-
timony from a substantial number of physicians who believe that it
had not been demonstrated scientifically that smoking causes can-
cer. 7 Further, studies funded by the tobacco industry 8 have failed
to induce lung cancer in animals through the inhalation of tobacco
smoke.'9
Thus, it remains for juries to decide in individual cases whether
enough evidence exists to show both that cigarettes can cause cancer
and that cigarette smoking actually did cause the cancer involved in
the particular case. Because of the increased public awareness of
smoking's harmful effects, it is likely that today's jurors believe that
cigarettes are more harmful than the tobacco industry would care to
admit.
41. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1333 (Supp. 11 1984). The Revision was labeled the
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act with the stated purpose of better informing the
public of hazards involved with cigarette smoking.
42. Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2204 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1341).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (Supp. 11 1984). The four required warning labels are:
(1) SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Dis-
ease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy; (2) SURGEON GENERAL'S
WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health;
(3) SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking by Pregnant Women May Result
in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight; (4) SURGEON GENERAL's
WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide. The labels are to be rotated
on a quarterly basis in alternating sequence.
45. See Rust, supra note 6, at 29, col. 1.
46. Id.
47. S. REP. No. 566, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADM. NEws 2652-53.
48. The tobacco industry has spent 120 million dollars in grants for research
through its Council on Tobacco Research. Rust, supra note 6, at 29, col. 7.
49. See id.
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HISTORY OF TOBACCO LITIGATION
Thus far, the tobacco industry has been largely immune from civil
liability for smoking related harm. Although tobacco manufacturers
have been held liable for consumer injuries resulting from foreign
objects in tobacco products,50 not a single plaintiff has prevailed
when the injuries have resulted from the carcinogenic components of
tobacco smoke.51 The tobacco industry has claimed 146 court victo-
ries, while plaintiffs claim none.5 2 For this reason, the tobacco indus-
try refuses to settle out of court. Of the ten reported cigarette law-
suits before 1984, four were dropped by the plaintiffs without a
settlement.53 In the remaining six, the defendant manufacturers pre-
vailed on the merits - three by summary judgment " and three af-
ter trial.55
The plaintiffs involved in these ten suits attempted recovery under
a number of legal theories, including fraud, 56 negligence, 57 implied
warranty5" and strict liability.59 In negligence actions, plaintiffs typi-
50. See, e.g., Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Rankin, 246 Ky. 65, 54 S.W.2d
612 (1932)(worms); Weiner v. D.A. Schulte, Inc., 275 Mass. 379, 176 N.E. 114 (1931)
(nails); Pillars v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918) (human
toe); Corum v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 N.C. 213, 171 S.E. 78 (1933) (fishhook);
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Wallace, 69 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
51. See Cigarette and Welfare Reform, supra note 20, at 298.
52. See San Diego Union, Dec. 23, 1985, at A9, col. 1.
53. See Garner, supra note 19, at 1426.
54. Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970); Al-
bright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1972), afd, 485 F.2d
678 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974); Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1958).
55. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 911 (1970); Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartigue
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
56. See Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956). In
Cooper, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had represented to the public that the
cigarettes were not harmful to the smoker's health. The defendant was granted summary
judgment because the plaintiff failed to show that the alleged misrepresentations were
made by the defendant.
57. See, e.g., Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d- 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartigue
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 375 U.S. 865 (1963);
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 987 (1966).
58. See, e.g., Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir.
1970); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 911 (1970); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292
(3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956).
59. See, e.g., Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970); Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964);
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cally have alleged two breaches of duty owed to the plaintiff by the
cigarette manufacturer. The first breach involves the manufacturer's
negligent failure to conduct tests to determine if cigarette smoking
causes injury to the smoker.60 The second breach involves the manu-
facturer's negligent failure to warn the consumer of any adverse con-
sequences related to the use of its product.6 In all cases, plaintiffs
alleged that cigarette manufacturers knew or should have known
that cigarette smoking endangered the smoker's health,62 for manu-
facturers are held to have the skill of an expert with superior knowl-
edge of their products and thus are obligated to keep reasonably
abreast of scientific information concerning those products.
63
In denying negligence liability, courts consistently have held that
liability cannot be imposed for unforeseeable harms because the
harms could not have been avoided by the manufacturer.6 4 Although
cigarette manufacturers must stay informed of scientific studies con-
cerning cigarette smoking, the risks involved with smoking were
deemed unforeseeable and unavoidable in light of the existing state
of technology. 65 Thus, cigarette manufacturers were not held liable
for failing to warn smokers of risks that were completely unknown
and uncontemplated.66
In six of the ten reported cases, plaintiffs attempted recovery
under theories of strict products liability and breach of implied war-
ranty.67 These plaintiffs contended that the defendants' cigarettes
were not reasonably fit for the purpose foi which they were sold.68
To prevail under an implied warranty or strict products liability the-
ory, a plaintiff must prove either that the cigarette manufacturer
told the consumer that the product would not cause injury to the
consumer, or that the product was adulterated, and that adulteration
Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
865 (1963).
60. See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 300 (3d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
61. Id. at 299-300.
62. See id.; Ross, 328 F.2d at 13 n.10; Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 40; Cooper v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 22, 23 (D. Mass. 1957).
63. See Ross, 328 F.2d at 13-14 n.13.
64. See, e.g., Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 39-40; Ross, 328 F.2d at 8-9; Hudson, 427
F.2d at 542.
65. See Ross, 328 F.2d at 13; Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 39-40 ("Tobacco companies
are not liable in negligence on the basis of medical studies yet to be published.").
66. See, e.g., Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 39-40; Ross, 328 F.2d at 9; Hudson, 427 F.2d
at 542.
67. See cases cited supra note 58. Generally, the courts treat breach of implied
warranty actions in the same manner as strict products liability actions - that is, when
liability is imposed under the theory of implied warranty, it is strict liability that is actu-
ally being imposed. See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and
Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 368 (1965). For the purpose of this Comment,
the two theories are combined.
68. See, e.g., Ross, 328 F.2d at 6.
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caused the consumer's injuries.6 9 An adulterated, and thus defective
product, is one which does not meet the standards established by the
industry for the product.7 0 In effect, these plaintiffs had to prove that
the tobacco itself was not "commercially satisfactory."171
A cigarette manufacturer may be held strictly liable for the fore-
seeable harm resulting from a product's defective condition if the
consumer uses the product for the purposes for which it was manu-
factured and marketed.7 2 Consequently, courts have imposed strict
liability upon cigarette manufacturers when plaintiffs were injured
by foreign substances in the cigarette or from substandard tobacco
used by the manufacturer. 3 The plaintiffs in all six cases did not
allege that the cigarettes contained foreign substances or were made
from commercially unsatisfactory tobacco.7 4 Rather, the plaintiffs
simply alleged that smoking cigarettes causes cancer and that smok-
ing the defendants' cigarettes caused each of them to develop
cancer.7 5
The attempts to hold cigarette manufacturers strictly liable for
smoking-related injuries have met with unanimous disapproval. First,
courts have refused to impose strict liability or negligence liability
for unforeseeable risks which "no developed skill or foresight can
avoid."78 Second, courts have refused to impose liability if a plaintiff
claimed only that his or her cancer was caused by smoking the de-
fendant's cigarettes, rather than claiming that the defendant's to-
bacco deviated from the commercial norm so as to be unreasonably
dangerous.77 Cigarettes containing only those substances inherent in
tobacco itself were not held unreasonably dangerous merely because
of the harmful effects of smoking.78 The overall judicial attitude is
best reflected by Judge Goodrich's concurring opinion in Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.
7 9
If a man buys whiskey and drinks too much of it and gets some liver
69. See Green, 391 F.2d at 111; Pritchard, 295 F.2d at 302.
70. See Ross, 328 F.2d at 9; Green, 391 F.2d at I11.
71. See Pritchard, 295 F.2d at 302.
72. See Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 39.
73. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
74. See cases cited supra notes 58-59.
75. See, e.g., Ross, 328 F.2d at 9.
76. See Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 39; Ross, 328 F.2d at 11; see also supra notes 52-
54 and accompanying text. But see Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169
(Fla. 1963) (foreseeability of harm held irrelevant in strict liability actions, although
liability denied on other grounds).
77. See cases cited supra notes 58-59.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1974).
79. 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
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trouble as a result I do not think the manufacturer is liable unless (1) the
manufacturer tells the customer the whiskey will not hurt him or (2) the
whiskey is adulterated whiskey-made with methyl alcohol, for instance.
The same surely is true of one who churns and sells butter to a customer
who should be on a nonfat diet. The same is true, likewise, as to one who
roasts and sells salted peanuts to a customer who should be on a no-salt
diet. Surely if the butter and peanuts are pure there is no liability if the
cholesterol count rises dangerously. In this case there was no claim that the
Chesterfields are not made of commercially satisfactory tobacco.80
This rationale effectively precludes recovery for those who started
smoking before the 1964 Surgeon General's Report, which publi-
cized the harmful nature of cigarette smoking. Yet even those who
began smoking after 1964 have been denied recovery."" With the
passage of the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act,82 which required that warnings be placed on cigarette packages,
the later plaintiffs hardly can claim they were unaware of the risks
of cigarette smoking. By being aware of these risks, plaintiffs are
vulnerable to the defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory
negligence, which often serve to bar plaintiff recovery completely.
8 3
Numerous complaints recently have been filed nationwide against
cigarette manufacturers.8 4 Most of these suits are predicated upon
the failure of cigarette manufacturers to adequately warn consumers
of the dangers inherent in smoking tobacco8 5 and of the addictive
qualities of tobacco. 8 The success of these theories, however, is
highly uncertain at this time. In a recent lawsuit alleging failure to
warn of addictive qualities, the jury found in favor of the defendant
manufacturer.87 The jury forewoman explained that the jurors were
not convinced that the plaintiff was addicted to cigarettes.8
In three other lawsuits predicated upon the failure to adequately
warn of adverse health consequences, federal district court judges
have reached contradictory conclusions. In all three lawsuits, the de-
fendant manufacturer argued that common-law tort actions were
preempted by the Federal Cigarette Advertising and Labeling Act,8 9
which prohibits states from requiring a warning on cigarettes which
differs from that required by the Act.90 In Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds
80. Id. at 302 (Goodrich, J., concurring).
81. See San Diego Union, Dec. 23, 1985, at A9, col. 1.
82. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 89-92,
79 Stat. 282).
83. See San Diego Union, Dec. 23, 1985, A9, col. I.
84. See Brody, supra note 5, at 49. As of November 1985 over 15 suits were
pending against the various cigarette manufacturers.
85. Id.
86. See San Diego Union, Dec. 24, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982).
90. See Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 3-84-606, slip op. (N.D.
Tenn. Dec. 18, 1985); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J.
1984).
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Tobacco Co.,91 a federal district court upheld the use of the warning
as a shield and thus dismissed the complaint. But in both Palmer v.
Liggett Group, Inc.,91 and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 3 the dis-
trict courts held that the required warnings did not preempt the
states' common-law tort actions. These courts reasoned that the Act
prohibits states from requiring different warnings, but does not pro-
hibit cigarette manufacturers from placing additional warnings upon
their packages. The Cipollone decision subsequently was reversed,
however, by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals which agreed with
the conclusion of Roysdon.94 Should the Palmer decision be reversed
on appeal, a fairly strong precedent will exist in favor of the Act's
preemption of state law tort claims based upon the failure of ciga-
rette manufacturers to adequately warn consumers of the risks in-
volved with smoking. If the Palmer decision is upheld, however, the
uncertainties and inconsistencies concerning the preemption issue
will continue.
Regardless of which theory of recovery plaintiffs have alleged, in
effect plaintiffs have urged the imposition of strict liability upon cig-
arette manufacturers for smoking-related injuries.95 In the past,
courts have not been willing to extend the doctrine of strict products
liability this far.98 But the district court decisions in Palmer and Ci-
pollone appear to signal a new judicial attitude toward such an im-
position. After all, if cigarettes are so dangerous as to be implicated
in over 300,000 deaths every year,97 it seems illogical to completl'
exempt cigarette manufacturers from liability for these deaths. As
91. No. 3-84-606, slip op. (N.D. Tenn. Dec. 18, 1985).
92. 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986).
93. 593 F. Supp. 1164, 1165 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
94. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that the Act preempts those state law damage actions relating to smoking and
health that challenge either the adequacy of the warning on cigarette packages
or the propriety of a party's actions with respect to the advertising and promo-
tion of cigarettes. We further hold that where the success of a state law dam-
age claim necessarily depends on the assertion that a party bore the duty to
provide a warning to consumers in addition to the warning Congress has re-
quired on cigarette packages, such claims are preempted as conflicting with the
Act.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986).
95. This analysis was made by Professor Gillam in 1958, arguing for the wide-
spread imposition of strict products liability upon producers. Gillam, Products Liability
in a Nutshell, 37 OR. L. REV. 119, 153-55 (1958).
96. See cases cited supra note 58.
97. H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3718, 3726.
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Justice Traynor noted over twenty years ago:
[I]t is ironic to exempt the manufacturer from liability on the ground that
any other sample of his product would produce like harm. If we scrutinize
deviations from a norm of safety as a basis for imposing liability, should we
not scrutinize all the more the product whose norm is danger? 8
Although courts have yet to impose strict liability upon cigarette
manufacturers for injuries related to smoking, manufacturers cer-
tainly should be concerned. The judicial trend, which does not ap-
pear to be changing, is to increase manufacturer responsibility for
harms related to products.9
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN TORT LAW
The trend in tort law has been to enhance the ability of an injured
plaintiff to obtain compensation from manufacturers of products
which have caused injuries. 100 In the past three decades, courts have
expanded manufacturer liability for product-related injuries through
the doctrine of strict products liability.10' Furthermore, many courts
have reduced a manufacturer's ability to avoid liability simply be-
cause of the plaintiff's own negligence.10 2 The cigarette manufactur-
ers soon may find that the defenses used successfully in the past,
such as the defendant's lack of knowledge and the plaintiff's assump-
tion of the risk, 0 3 no longer are dispositive. In effect, courts have
moved toward making the manufacturer an insurer of its products0
- a move which courts in past cigarette litigation have failed to
initiate 0 5
Expansion of Strict Liability
Should the courts continue the expansion of strict products liabil-
ity, the doctrine soon would encompass manufacturer liability for
products whose norm is danger - products such as cigarettes. Be-
ginning with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Corp.,10 6 the courts have
expanded a manufacturer's liability for injuries related to the use of
its products. 107 Indeed, one commentator described the MacPherson
decision as marking "the transition from industrial revolution to a
98. See Traynor, supra note 67, at 368.
99. See generally id.; Levy & Ursin, supra note 12.
100. See generally Traynor, supra note 67; Levy & Ursin, supra note 12.
101. See Levy & Ursin, supra note 12, at 501-04.
102. Id. at 502; see also infra notes 144-59 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
104. See Levy & Ursin, supra note 12, at 500.
105. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
106. 217 N.Y. 382 (1916). In MacPherson, the New York Court of Appeals abol-
ished the privity requirement which had precluded most consumers from recovering
against manufacturers of defective products.
107. See Traynor, supra note 67, at 363.
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settled industrialized society." 108 Prior to MacPherson, the courts
reasoned that economic growth would be hampered by holding man-
ufacturers liable for any and all injuries attributable to their prod-
ucts. 10 9 After MacPherson, however, courts increasingly have re-
placed the traditional rationale with reforms premised upon goals of
loss distribution, accident reduction, and fairness.110 Following this
trend toward imposing liability as a more effective method of loss
distribution, cigarette manufacturers soon may be held responsible
for injuries related to their products.
The goal of spreading accident losses through insurance was advo-
cated first by Justice Traynor in his concurring opinion in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co.""1 "The cost of an injury and the loss of time
or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured,
and a needless one, for the risk of the injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business. 1 112 Nineteen years after Escola, the California Supreme
Court established a theory of strict products liability in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.11 3 The concept of loss distribution, em-
phasized by the Greenman court and subsequent courts1 4 "insure[s]
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne
by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves."1 15
The theory expounded in Greenman imposes liability upon the
manufacturer if the product is defective and causes personal injury
to the consumer.116 The Greenman rationale subsequently was
adopted with some modifications by the Second Restatement of
Torts,11 7 which imposes strict liability upon anyone "who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user."' A clear majority of states have adopted section 402A, read-
108. Id.
109. Id. at 364.
110. Levy & Ursin, supra note 12, at 499.
111. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441.
113. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
114. Levy & Ursin, supra note 12, at 501.
115. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
116. Id.
117. See Snyman, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Strict Products Liability in
the United States, 11 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 241, 267 (1982).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1974). A defective product is
unreasonably dangerous as marketed if (1) the flaw was present in the product at the
time it left the manufacturer's control; (2) the manufacturer fails to adequately warn the
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ily accepting the strict liability concept.'1 9 The trend sparked by
Greenman toward expanding manufacturer liability thus has taken
hold throughout the country.
Unfortunately, the Second Restatement's definition of a defective
product has slowed the expansion of strict liability in the area of
inherently dangerous products - products such as cigarettes. 120 Be-
cause the Restatement test imposes liability only for the unexpected
dangers of the product, liability is avoided when the risk is foresee-
able to the plaintiff.' 2' Moreover, with the abundant publicity of the
cancer-producing potential of cigarette smoking, the Restatement
view effectively denies liability for injuries arising out of tobacco
smoking - "good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely be-
cause the effects of smoking may be harmful .... 11,22 The policy of
allocating losses among the public seemingly has been halted in the
many states adopting the Restatement view.
Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has continued the
trend toward increasing manufacturer responsibility. In Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corp.,23 the court rejected the Restatement's "unrea-
sonably dangerous" standard because it burdened the plaintiff with
proving elements very similar to those required for proof of negli-
gence. 24 The court reasoned that this added burden would under-
mine the very purpose of strict liability as expressed in Greenman.225
Further, the court noted that the "unreasonably dangerous" stan-
dard would exclude liability when the product's dangers were obvi-
ous or when warnings were attached to products. 2 Thus, the court
user of a risk or hazard inherent in the product; or (3) the design of the product was
defective in such a way that the product carries a high risk of harm in normal use. See
W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEErON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 695-98 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
119. The following states have adopted section 402A by statute: Alabama, Ari-
zona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Comment, Comparative Negligence
and Strict Products Liability: Where Do We Stand? Where Do We Go?, 29 VILL. L.
REV. 695 (1984).
120. In light of the fact that cigarettes have been linked to over 300,000 deaths
every year, it can hardly be argued that cigarettes are not inherently dangerous. See
generally H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3718.
121. See Traynor, supra note 67, at 370.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1974).
123. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
124. Id. at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
125. See Levy & Ursin, supra note 12, at 503. The purpose of strict liability, as
expressed in Greenman, was to impose liability upon manufacturers to ensure that losses
would be distributed among the public. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
126. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442; see also
Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Products Liability Theory, 34 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 529, 537 (1983).
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held that plaintiffs need only prove that a defect in the product's
manufacture or design proximately caused their injury. 2 7 The
Cronin court, however, did not offer an alternative to the section
402A definition of defect. 12 8
In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 29 the California Supreme
Court espoused two alternative methods by which a product may be
proved defective. In doing so, the court reaffirmed its intention of
facilitating plaintiff recovery by removing negligence principles from
strict liability actions. 30 The first test requires that the plaintiff
show "that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably fore-
seeable manner."'' This, in essence, is the Restatement test. The
second test allows a finding of a defect "even if it satisfies ordinary
consumer expectations, if through hindsight the jury determines that
the product's design embodies 'excessive preventable danger,' or in
other words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the
challenged design outweighs the benefits of such design. 1 1 32 Defec-
tiveness thus is measured by present knowledge of the product's
safety-not the knowledge at the time of manufacture.13 3 Foresee-
ability of the risk, therefore, becomes irrelevant. 134
The Barker decision continued the California Supreme Court's
steady expansion of strict products liability, remaining true to the
policy goals advocated by Justice Traynor in Escola.135 By allowing
two alternate methods to prove a product defective, the court in-
creased the incidence of plaintiff recovery in products cases as com-
pared to that attainable under section 402A. 183 Barker further facili-
tates plaintiff recovery by shifting the burden of proof to the
defendant. Once the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design
proximately caused the injury, the burden then shifts to the defend-
ant to prove that the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the
risks of danger inherent in such design.' 37 Finally, the Barker court
127. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
128. See Diamond, supra note 126, at 537.
129. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
130. See Levy & Ursin, supra note 12, at 503.
131. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
132. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236. This second method of
establishing a product defect has been labeled the Barker "risk-utility test."
133. See id.
134. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 118, at 695-702.
135. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
136. See Levy & Ursin, supra note 12, at 503.
137. In determining whether the benefits outweigh the risks, the court considered
1151
noted the expanding nature of strict products liability doctrine, and
suggested a further expansion: extending liability to manufacturers
of products whose "norm is danger."
138
Should the courts extend liability for products whose "norm is
danger," cigarette manufacturers surely would be unable to escape
liability for smoking-related injuries. The California Supreme
Court's policy goals of risk allocation and loss distribution13 9 are
consistent with such an expansion of strict products liability. In the
past, the doctrines of assumption of the risk and contributory negli-
gence have inhibited courts from extending liability for smoking-re-
lated injuries. 40 In conforming to the policy goals behind strict lia-
bility, however, courts have less reason to be inhibited in the
future.
1 41
It is necessary at this point to distinguish obviously dangerous
products such as knives or matches from products such as cigarettes.
Generally, those who manufacture knives or matches are not held
strictly liable for injuries resulting from the use of their product if
the product is manufactured without flaws. 42 This Comment does
not suggest that manufacturers of knives or matches should be held
liable when unfortunate and perhaps careless users are injured by
the products. Rather, cigarettes should be treated as being very dif-
ferent from knives or matches. As Justice Traynor observed:
The now patent risks of cigarettes are not comparable to those of, say,
matches or knives. Commentators describe the ignitable tip or the cutting
edge as qualities generic to the goods; both the manufacturer and the con-
sumer expect and want the product to burn or cut. The cancer-producing
qualities of cigarettes are generic only in the sense that all cigarettes have
those qualities but they are neither produced nor consumed for that
reason.4 3
Used properly, a knife isn't dangerous; used properly, a cigarette is
dangerous.
five factors: (1) the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design; (2) the likeli-
hood that such danger would occur; (3) the mechanical feasibility of a safer design; (4)
the financial cost of an improved design; and (5) the adverse consequences to the product
and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design. See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d
at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
138. Id. at 430 n.10, 573 P.2d at 455 n.10, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237 n.10; see also
Levy & Ursin, supra note 12, at 504 n.42 ("Barker not only expands the incidence of
strict products liability but may itself be an intermediate step toward further expan-
sion-including strict liability for products that would not be considered defective in any
ordinary sense.").
139. See generally Levy & Ursin, supra note 12.
140. See generally supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
141. Consistently, the courts have been reducing the ability of manufacturers to
rely upon such defenses in products liability actions. See Levy & Ursin, supra note 12, at
504-I1.
142. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 649 (4th ed. 1971).
143. Traynor, supra note 67, at 370.
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Reduction of Available Defenses
Perhaps the greatest obstacle in the path of a plaintiff's recovery
has been the defense of assumption of the risk. 14 But manufacturers
of harmful products are finding increasingly that the defense, highly
successful in the past, is no longer available in products liability ac-
tions. This defense is lost because many jurisdictions have taken two
important steps towards facilitating plaintiff recovery. The first step
was abolishing the defenses of contributory negligence and assump-
tion of the risk, while adopting a system of comparative fault.145 The
second step was applying comparative fault principles to strict prod-
ucts liability actions.' 48 The goal behind these steps has been to dis-
tribute a greater portion of the risk of injury to the public.
1 47
The doctrine of comparative fault arose out of widespread dissatis-
faction with the absolute defense of contributory negligence. 48
Rather than operating as a complete bar to recovery, comparative
fault shifts the focus from total liability to relative liability, with the
recoverable damages being reduced in proportion to plaintiff's
fault.149 Presently, forty-one states have adopted some form of com-
parative fault. 150
In abolishing the absolute defense of contributory negligence,
many states also have abolished the defense of assumption of the
144. See generally supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. This Comment dis-
cusses the evolution of tort law towards the abolition of the complete defenses of assump-
tion of the risk and contributory negligence. It is argued here that this evolution will
greatly enhance plaintiff recovery against cigarette manufacturers. For a discussion of
how plaintiffs may attempt recovery for cigarette-related harms in states that have not
yet abolished~ the complete defenses, see Note, Plaintif's Conduct as a Defense to
Claims Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 99 HARV. L. REv. 809 (1986).
145. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
147. Vargo, Something Old and Something New: Defenses to Strict Liability, 15
TRIAL 48, 54 (1979).
148. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 118, at 469.
149. Id. at 470-72.
150. The nine remaining contributory negligence states are Alabama, Arizona,
Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Vir-
ginia. See Leff & Pinto, Comparative Negligence in Strict Products Liability: The
Courts Render the Final Judgment, 89 DICK. L. REV. 915 nn.21 & 22 (1985). Basically,
there are two general forms of the comparative fault doctrine. There is a "pure" form,
adopted in 12 states, which allows a plaintiff to recover a percentage of his damages even
in cases in which the plaintiff's negligence exceeds that of the defendant. The second is
the "modified" form, adopted in 29 states, which allows the plaintiff to recover only if the
plaintiff is less at fault than the defendant. The jurisdictions adopting a "modified" form
are split in the event that the plaintiff's negligence equals that of the defendant. See
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 118, at 471-75.
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risk.151 In Li v. Yellow Cab. Co.,1 52 the California Supreme Court
merged "the defense of assumption of risk . . . into the general
scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those par-
ticular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is no
more than a variant of contributory negligence.1153 By merging the
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk into
the doctrine of comparative fault, the courts have removed two very
effective defenses asserted by manufacturers of harmful products.
Because the defense of assumption of the risk previously had served
to deny recovery in cigarette-injury cases, replacing the defense with
a system of comparative fault will greatly benefit plaintiffs injured
by cigarette smoking.
1 54
Another benefit to plaintiffs has been the application of compara-
tive fault principles to strict products liability actions. In Daly v.
General Motors Corp.,155 rather than applying the defense of as-
sumption of risk which would have barred any recovery, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that principles of comparative fault should
apply to strict products liability cases. Since Daly, the vast majority
of states have applied comparative fault principles to strict liability
actions.1 56 Nonetheless, a number of courts maintain that the doc-
trine of comparative fault is inapplicable to strict products liability
actions, reasoning that to compare a user's fault with the producer's
no-fault liability is to "mix apples and oranges."
157
Courts applying comparative negligence principles have rejected
this reasoning, stating that the underlying purpose of comparative
fault - the fair allocation of loss among all parties legally responsi-
ble in proportion to the fault of each - applies equally well to strict
products liability actions.1 58 Comparative negligence is fair to the
plaintiff since recovery no longer will be barred completely; it is fair
151. The states merging assumption of the risk into the doctrine of comparative
fault are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York,
North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See J. PALMER &
S. FLANAGAN, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 1.22 (rev. ed. 1985).
152. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
153. Id. at 825, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
154. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
155. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
156. See J. PALMER & S. FLANAGAN, supra note 151, § 3A.220.
157. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 118, at 478. See generally Levine, Strict
Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of Fault and No-Fault,
14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337 (1977) ("Comparative fault cannot logically and consistently
be applied to the strict liability cause of action .... How can comparative fault exist in
a cause of action which proceeds irrespective of fault?"). Six courts have held that com-
parative principles are inapplicable to strict products liability actions: Colorado, Ne-
braska, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington. See Comment, Com-
parative Negligence and Strict Products Liability: Where Do We Stand? Where Do We
Go?, 29 VILL. L. REV. 695 (1984).
158. See generally J. PALMER & S. FLANAGAN, supra note 151, § 3A.220.
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to the defendant manufacturer because the defendant will be liable
only for that harm caused by the product. 159 By applying compara-
tive fault principles, including the abandonment of the assumption of
the risk defense, plaintiffs in cigarette actions stand a better chance
of obtaining, at minimum, a partial recovery.
JUDICIAL HESITANCE
The final obstacle in the path of smoker recovery is the lingering
judicial hesitance to hold cigarette manufacturers strictly liable for
smoking-related injuries. A number of possible explanations exists as
to why the courts are so hesitant. First, because these smokers freely
chose to engage in an activity known to be harmful, they should not
be entitled to compensation if injured as a result of that activity.
Second, it would be unjust to impose liability upon a producer en-
gaged in a lawful enterprise when the injured users of the product
were fully aware of the dangers. Also, because of the vast number of
individuals injured by cigarettes each year,1 60 such an imposition of
liability possibly could destroy the tobacco industry. Finally, because
Congress has expressed the intent to maintain the tobacco indus-
try,161 any judicial imposition of liability that severely could harm
the industry would be contrary to the express intent of Congress.
Nevertheless, with the constant expansion of strict products liabil-
ity, courts soon may be swayed by arguments in favor of imposing
strict liability upon cigarette manufacturers. One such argument
contends that the harms caused by cigarette smoking are felt not
only by injured smokers but by the public as a whole.'2 2 It is the
public that eventually pays for the smokers' health care, either
through private insurance programs or government social pro-
grams; e1 3 cigarette manufacturers pay for little or none of the im-
mense costs which their products impose upon society. The cost of
cigarette smoking, in terms of health care and lost productivity due
to cigarette-related illness, is astronomical, estimated to be as much
159. Id.
160. Potential plaintiffs have been estimated to number as many as 700,000 per
year. This figure is comprised of more than 300,000 annual deaths and 400,000 injuries.
See Rust, supra note 6; H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3718, 3725.
161. E.g., 123 CONG. REC. H594 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1977) ("No one suggests that
the tobacco industry should be eliminated overnight or that the Government should pro-
hibit smoking altogether.").
162. See Bucholtz, Legal Aspects of the Control of Tobacco, 4 LEGAL MED. Q. 14
(1980); Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, supra note 20.
163. See Bucholtz, supra note 162, at 18.
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as twelve billion dollars per year. 16 By imposing liability upon the
cigarette producers for smoking-related injuries, the costs associated
with these injuries can be shifted from the general public to the in-
dustry, ultimately to be shifted to the smokers themselves. 16 5
Further, those favoring imposing strict liability upon cigarette
manufacturers for smoking-related injuries are not dissuaded by the
possible destruction of the tobacco industry. Anticigarette groups
promoting suits against the tobacco industry only expect to achieve a
moderate cigarette price increase in order to internalize the cost of
cigarette injuries and make it more difficult for the young to start
smoking. 6 One Wall Street analyst projects that 65,000 people per
year, receiving $100,000 each in damages, would add only twenty-
two cents to the price of a pack of cigarettes. 167 Most commentators,
however, agree that an increase in excess of $2.50 per pack is a more
realistic projection.16 8 Although such an increase indeed may cause
substantial harm to the tobacco industry, if the industry cannot pay
for the injuries it causes, perhaps it should be curtailed.
CONCLUSION
Cigarette manufacturers traditionally have escaped tort liability
for smoking-related injuries. There are signs, however, that they may
no longer escape this liability. Both the constant expansion of strict
products liability and the diminishing availability of absolute de-
fenses have created a climate for an increased potential of recovery
for the cigarette-injured plaintiff. Further, the increasing amount of
evidence connecting cigarette smoking with cancer and other dis-
eases has led to a growing public awareness of these adverse effects.
Thus, juries may be more inclined to hold cigarette manufacturers
liable for injuries caused from smoking cigarettes. Cigarette manu-
facturers would be wise to heed the writing on the wall; the courts
are not likely to allow the tobacco industry to continue to profit from
cigarette sales in the face of the hundreds of thousands of smokers
killed each year by cigarette smoking.
DAVID M. REAVES
164. See generally Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, supra note 20. The article out-
lines numerous studies concerning the public cost of cigarette smoking, ranging from
4.23 billion to 12 billion dollars per year.
165. Id. at 324.
166. See Rust, supra note 6, at 29, col. 1; see also Note, Plaintiffls Conduct as a
Defense to Claims Against Cigarette Manufacturers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 809, 824 (1986)
("Recent studies . . .have suggested that cigarette consumption is at least somewhat
sensitive to price changes, especially among young smokers.").
167. Rust, supra note 6, at 29, col. I.
168. Id.
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